The untold story of how Americas brightest academic minds revolutionized intelligence analysis at the CIA
In the early days of the Cold War, the United States faced a crisis in intelligence analysis. A series of intelligence failures in 1949 and 1950, including the failure to warn about the North Korean invasion of South Korea, made it clear that gut instinct and traditional practices were no longer sufficient for intelligence analysis in the nuclear age. The new director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Walter Bedell Smith, had a mandate to reform it.
Based on new archival research in declassified documents and the participants personal papers, The Intelligence Intellectuals reveals the neglected history of how Americas brightest academic minds were recruited by the CIA to revolutionize intelligence analysis during this critical period. Peter C. Grace describes how the scientifically sound analysis methods that they introduced significantly helped the United States gain an advantage in the Cold War, and these new analysts legitimized the role of the recently created CIA in the national security community. Grace demonstrates how these professors—such as William Langer from Harvard, Sherman Kent from Yale, and Max Millikan from MIT—developed systematic approaches to intelligence analysis that shaped the CIAs methodology for decades to come.
Readers interested in the history of the Cold War and in intelligence, scholars of intelligence studies, Cold War historians, and intelligence practitioners seeking to understand their crafts foundations will all value this insightful history about the place of social science in national security.
The untold story of how Americas brightest academic minds revolutionized intelligence analysis at the CIA
In the early days of the Cold War, the United States faced a crisis in intelligence analysis. A series of intelligence failures in 1949 and 1950, including the failure to warn about the North Korean invasion of South Korea, made it clear that gut instinct and traditional practices were no longer sufficient for intelligence analysis in the nuclear age. The new director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Walter Bedell Smith, had a mandate to reform it.
Based on new archival research in declassified documents and the participants personal papers, The Intelligence Intellectuals reveals the neglected history of how Americas brightest academic minds were recruited by the CIA to revolutionize intelligence analysis during this critical period. Peter C. Grace describes how the scientifically sound analysis methods that they introduced significantly helped the United States gain an advantage in the Cold War, and these new analysts legitimized the role of the recently created CIA in the national security community. Grace demonstrates how these professors—such as William Langer from Harvard, Sherman Kent from Yale, and Max Millikan from MIT—developed systematic approaches to intelligence analysis that shaped the CIAs methodology for decades to come.
Readers interested in the history of the Cold War and in intelligence, scholars of intelligence studies, Cold War historians, and intelligence practitioners seeking to understand their crafts foundations will all value this insightful history about the place of social science in national security.
Peter C. Grace is a lecturer on politics and international relations at the University of Otago, New Zealand. He is one of the volume editors of New Zealands Foreign Policy under the Jacinda Ardern Government.
Preface
Acknowledgments
List of Abbreviations
Introduction: Clear and Prescient Danger
The Promise of Social Science before 1945
A Struggle for Existence 1946-1950
The Failure of the Office of Reports and Estimates 1947-1950
The Intel Intellectual as Administrator and the Reforms of 1950-1953
The Intel Intellectuals and the Emergence of a Strategic Intelligence Discipline
The National Intelligence Estimates of Soviet Strategic Intentions and Capabilities
Soviet Economic Capabilities and the Inventory of Ignorance
The Princeton Consultants
Kents "Theory of the Fuck Up of the Imponderables"
Conclusion: The Intel Intellectuals as Agents of Change
Appendix: National Intelligence Estimate-25: Probable Soviet Courses of Action to Mid-1952
Bibliography
Index
About the Author
[C]ompelling reading for anyone who has thought about how to analyze information.
-Wall Street Journal
[The Intelligence Intellectuals] fills a useful gap for readers and historians because it creates a comprehensive, yet objective, accounting of intelligence reforms during a critical time.
-Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism
[C]ompelling reading for anyone who has thought about how to analyze information.
-Wall Street Journal
[The Intelligence Intellectuals] fills a useful gap for readers and historians because it creates a comprehensive, yet objective, accounting of intelligence reforms during a critical time.
-Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism
