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9780803979635 Academic Inspection Copy

Local Commons and Global Interdependence

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Neither modern states nor small farmers in remote areas of poor countries can appeal to authoritative hierarchies to enforce rules governing their relations with one another. Both must finds ways to reach agreements that can be maintained through reciprocity if they are to avoid the "tragedy of the commons" from which they cannot extract themselves. This book explores the conditions for and possibilities of reaching such agreements. It develops a theoretical understanding of co-operation and discord at local and global levels, focusing on two of the key variables that affect outcomes - the number of actors, and the degree of heterogeneity between them. The book provides a broad-ranging introduction to the theory and theoretical issues involved, combining this with a detailed review of research evidence on how agreements to co-operate are established and maintained.
Elinor Ostrom is the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington. She was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 2001; is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; and a recipient of the Frank E. Seidman Prize in Political Economy and the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science. Her books include Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action; Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (with Roy Gardner and James Walker); and Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains (with Robert Keohane).
Introduction - Robert O Keohane and Elinor Ostrom PART ONE: THEORETICAL PUZZLES The Problem of Scale in Human/Environment Relationships - Oran R Young The Politics of Scope - Duncan Snidal Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Institutions Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems - Lisa L Martin PART TWO: EVIDENCE FROM THE LABORATORY Heterogeneities, Information and Conflict Resolution - Steven Hackett, Dean Dudley and James Walker Experimental Evidence on Sharing Contracts PART THREE: EVIDENCE FROM THE FIELD Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action - Elinor Ostrom The Conditions for Successful Collective Action - Gary D Libecap Self-interest and Environmental Management - Kenneth A Oye and James H Maxwell Heterogeneities at Two Levels - Ronald B Mitchell State, Non-state Actors and Intentional Oil Pollution
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