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9780801894725 Academic Inspection Copy

The Limits of U.S. Military Capability

Lessons from Vietnam and Iraq
  • ISBN-13: 9780801894725
  • Publisher: JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS
    Imprint: JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS
  • By James H. Lebovic
  • Price: AUD $120.00
  • Stock: 0 in stock
  • Availability: This book is temporarily out of stock, order will be despatched as soon as fresh stock is received.
  • Local release date: 14/08/2010
  • Format: Hardback 312 pages Weight: 0g
  • Categories: Military history [HBW]
Description
Table of
Contents
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Political scientist James H. Lebovic establishes that the size, strength, flexibility, and adaptability of the U.S. military cannot ensure victory in asymmetrical conflicts. In The Limits of U.S. Military Capability, Lebovic shows how political and psychological factors trumped U.S. military superiority in Vietnam and Iraq, where inappropriate strategies, low stakes, and unrealistic goals mired the United States military in protracted, no-win conflicts. Lebovic contends that the United States is at a particular disadvantage when fighting a counterinsurgency without the full support of the host government; when leveraging various third parties (the adversary's foreign allies, societal leaders, and indigenous populations); when attempting to build coalitions and nations while involved in combat; and when sustaining government and public support at home when costs rise and benefits diminish.Lebovic cautions against involving the U.S. military in operations without first considering U.S. stakes and suggests the military take a less—is—more approach when choosing to employ force. Ambitious goals bring higher costs, unexpected results, diminished options, and a greater risk of failure. Rejecting the heavy—handed approach that is typical of most comparisons of the Vietnam and Iraq wars, The Limits of U.S. Military Capability carefully assesses evidence to develop lessons applicable to other conflicts -- especially the ongoing war in Afghanistan.

Acknowledgments
1. Introduction
2. Leveraging the Adversary's Forces: The Wars in Vietnam and Iraq
3. Leveraging the Adversary's Support Base: States, Populations, and Societies
4. Leveraging the Adversary's Leaders: The Balance of Resolve and US Exhaustion
5. Leveraging Host Governments: The Challenges of Institution-Building
6. Conclusion: Vietnam and Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Future
Notes
References
Index

""Lebovic admirably weaves together an analysis [of U.S.-Host Nation interactions] showing how all these factors determine the success of supporting a weak, ineffective, or corrupt friendly government facing an insurgent challenge.""

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