A clear-eyed look at how political pressures and military influences led President Obama to significantly increase US involvement in the War in Afghanistan, even as the prospects for success seemed increasingly dim. Barack Obama entered the White House in 2009 with a mandate to end the wars and occupations begun under George W. Bush. The American public and foreign policy-makers alike were ready to withdraw from these unpopular and unwieldy conflicts. While Obama fulfilled his campaign promises with the "bad war" in Iraq, the "good war" in Afghanistan followed a very different path. Unlike his predecessor, Obama chose to prioritize South Asia as the focus of the United States military. Following a strategic review, Obama and his military advisors decided to replicate the Iraqi troop surge in Afghanistan, embarking on a labor-intensive counterinsurgency campaign. Unlike the Iraqi surge, however, Obama placed an eighteen-month limit on the increased troop deployment promising a withdrawal in the summer of 2011. Despite a revised strategy that emphasized training the Afghan forces, the Afghan units struggled to perform in a leadership role, remaining dependent on American airpower. These problems were compounded by the civilian side of the government that suffered from corruption and appeared illegitimate to much of the Afghan population. After Obama withdrew troops, the Taliban began their resurgence in 2014. Around the same time the Islamic State emerged on the scene in Iraq and Syria, requiring new counterterrorism efforts that drained resources from Afghanistan and shifted the US focus back to the Middle East, leaving Afghanistan more vulnerable to local and international extremists. Peace talks with the Taliban broke down, and the war dragged on-becoming an unwinnable quagmire. As part of the Landmark Presidential Decisions series, Losing the Good War analyzes how Obama's campaign promises translated into policy, particularly the decision-making around the surge. Sarah Burns and Robert Haswell shine a light on this mishandled episode in US foreign policy.
Sarah Burns is associate professor of political science at Rochester Institute of Technology. She is the author of The Politics of War Powers: The Theory and History of Presidential Unilateralism (Kansas, 2019). Robert Haswell is a PhD candidate at Carleton University. He is researching the subject of counterinsurgency within American foreign policy during the Vietnam War and the War in Afghanistan.
"This concise overview of President Obama's decision making during the Afghan war sheds new light on one of the nation's most controversial conflicts. The authors mastery of issues related to the American presidency, foreign policy making, and the United States military, shines through on every page. Burns and Haswell's account of the involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the Afghan war is worth the price of admission alone. I highly recommended this book for courses on the American presidency, military history, foreign policymaking, or for anyone interested in America's longest war."-Stephen F. Knott, author of Rush to Judgment: George W. Bush, the War on Terror, and His Critics "Barack Obama entered the White House promising to win the 'good war' in Afghanistan. But as Sarah Burns and Robert Haswell excellently demonstrate, Obama faced an impossible dilemma. While Americans were weary of the conflict, the trauma of 9/11 remained, and they demanded a successful conclusion to the war. Thus, Obama could not appear soft on terror without suffering political consequences, leading him to rely on military solutions in Afghanistan that were often disconnected from the reality on the ground. For those wondering why Afghanistan became America's longest war, Losing the Good War sheds light on how the pressures of domestic politics and national narratives can constrain even the most powerful leaders."-Tizoc Chavez, author of The Diplomatic Presidency: American Foreign Policy from FDR to George H. W. Bush
